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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
 
NO. 97-3505 
 
STEVEN R. LOVASZ, 
       Appellant 
 
v. 
 
SCIG SUPT. DONALD T. VAUGHN 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Western District of Pennsylvania 
(D.C. Civil No. 97-cv-01389) 
 
Submitted by the Clerk for a certificate of 
appealability pursuant to 28 U.S.C. S 2253 
October 23, 1997 
 
Before: BECKER, NYGAARD, and ROTH, Circuit Judges. 
(MOTIONS PANEL A) 
 
(Filed January 14, 1998) 
 
       STEVEN ROBERT LOVASZ #AJ-1800 
       Graterford SCI 
       P.O. Box 244 
       Graterford, PA 19426 
 
       Pro se 
 
 
  
OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
BECKER, Circuit Judge. 
 
The habeas petition of Steven Lovasz currently before us, 
on application for a certificate of appealability, presents the 
question whether a second or subsequent petition for post- 
conviction relief, filed according to the procedural rules of 
the state, constitutes "a properly filed application" for the 
purpose of triggering the tolling mechanism of 28 U.S.C. 
S 2244(d)(2) without regard to the merits of the petition. 
Because we conclude that it does, we will grant the 
certificate of appealability, reverse the dismissal of Lovasz's 
petition, and remand this matter to the district court for 
further consideration. 
 
I. 
 
In April 1988, Lovasz was sentenced in the Court of 
Common Pleas of Fayette County, Pennsylvania, to life in 
prison for murder. After his conviction was affirmed on 
direct appeal, Lovasz filed a petition for post-conviction 
relief under Pennsylvania's Post Conviction Relief Act 
("PCRA"), 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. SS 9541-9546. After relief 
was denied, Lovasz filed a second PCRA petition, which was 
dismissed on May 18, 1995. The Pennsylvania Superior 
Court affirmed on March 4, 1996. The Pennsylvania 
Supreme Court denied Lovasz's petition for allowance of 
appeal on September 26, 1996. 
 
On July 30, 1997, Lovasz filed in the district court the 
current petition for a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. 
S 2254. The district court dismissed the petition as time- 
barred under S 2244(d)(1), without discussing the tolling 
mechanism of 28 U.S.C. S 2244(d)(2). Before us now is 
Lovasz's request for a certificate of appealability to appeal 
from this dismissal. 
 
II. 
 
Title 28 U.S.C. S 2244(d), enacted as part of the 
Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 
("AEDPA"), in relevant part provides: 
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       (1) A 1-year period of limitation shall apply to an 
       application for a writ of habeas corpus by a person 
       in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State 
       court. The limitation period shall run from the 
       latest of -- 
 
       (A) the date on which the judgment became final by 
       the conclusion of direct review or the expiration 
       of the time for seeking such review; 
 
       . . . 
 
       (2) The time during which a properly filed application 
       for State post-conviction or other collateral review 
       with respect to the pertinent judgment or claim is 
       pending shall not be counted toward any period of 
       limitation under this subsection. 
 
28 U.S.C. S 2244(d). We have yet to consider what 
constitutes "a properly filed application" to trigger the 
tolling mechanism of S 2244(d)(2). 
 
Principles of comity inform our decision. In our federal 
system, "the States should have the first opportunity to 
address and correct alleged violations of state prisoner's 
federal rights." Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 731 
(1991). Such respect for the states has given rise to the 
well-established rule that a federal court should not find a 
state prisoner's claims procedurally barred from federal 
habeas review unless state law "clearly foreclose[s]" review 
of the claims. Toulson v. Beyer, 987 F.2d 984, 987 (3d Cir. 
1993); see Banks v. Horn, 126 F.3d 206, 211 (3d Cir. 
1997); Doctor v. Walters, 96 F.3d 675, 683 (3d Cir. 1996). 
Moreover, in enacting AEDPA, of which S 2244(d) is a part, 
Congress intended to "reduce federal intrusion into state 
criminal proceedings." Banks, 126 F.3d at 213. 
 
Thus, if a state allows petitioners to file second or 
subsequent petitions for post-conviction relief, federal 
courts should not undermine the state's decision by 
refusing to toll the one-year period of limitation of 
S 2244(d)(1) where a second or subsequent petition is 
pending in the state court system. Nor should we 
discourage petitioners from exhausting all their claims in 
state court, even by means of a second or subsequent 
 
                                3 
  
petition for post-conviction relief where permissible under 
state law, before seeking habeas review in federal court. 
 
We believe that "a properly filed application" is one 
submitted according to the state's procedural requirements, 
such as the rules governing the time and place of filing. A 
Pennsylvania PCRA petitioner, for example, must file a 
motion with the clerk of the court in which he was 
convicted and sentenced, Pa. R. Crim. P. 1501, generally 
within one year of the date the judgment becomes final, 42 
Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. S 9545(b)(1). If a petitioner complies 
with these procedural requirements, or other procedural 
requirements the state imposes, his petition, even a second 
or successive petition, is "a properly filed application" for 
purposes of S 2244(d)(2). While we recognize that the 
Pennsylvania Supreme Court has announced strict rules 
regarding the granting of second and subsequent PCRA 
petitions, see Commonwealth v. Lawson, 549 A.2d 107 (Pa. 
1988), Pennsylvania allows for the filing of second or 
subsequent PCRA petitions, see 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. 
S 9545(b)(1), and courts occasionally grant relief in such 
proceedings, see e.g., Commonwealth v. Morales, 701 A.2d 
516 (Pa. 1997). 
 
Further, we reject the notion that a meritless PCRA 
petition cannot constitute "a properly filed application" 
under S 2244(d)(2). Rather, in considering whether a 
petition for post-conviction relief is properlyfiled, district 
courts should not inquire into its merits. A rule requiring 
an inquiry into the merits of a second or subsequent PCRA 
petition in order to determine if it was properlyfiled could 
become problematic, as exemplified in Hughes v. Irvin, 967 
F. Supp. 775 (E.D.N.Y. 1997). In Hughes, the district court 
considered whether a seventh motion for post-conviction 
relief constituted "a properly filed application" under 
S 2244(d)(2). The state's lower court had denied the motion 
without a hearing, but the state appeals court reversed and 
remanded for an evidentiary hearing. On remand, the lower 
court made findings of fact and again denied the motion. 
 
If it were to consider the merits, the Hughes court 
mused, was the seventh motion "a properly filed 
application," and if so, at what points in time? Was it 
"improperly filed" because the lower court found it 
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meritless? Did it become "properly filed" when the state 
appellate court reversed and remanded, only to lose that 
status when the lower court again denied it on the merits? 
Id. at 779. While such questions may be intriguing or 
provocative, we, like the Hughes court, find them both 
inappropriate and unnecessary in determining whether the 
petition for post-conviction relief was properlyfiled. After 
all, Congress chose the phrase "a properly filed 
application," one into which we do not read any 
requirement that the application be non-frivolous. But see 
Valentine v. Senkowski, 966 F. Supp. 239, 241 (S.D.N.Y. 
1997) (assuming that an application for collateral review 
must be non-frivolous in order to be properly filed under 
S 2244(d)(2)). 
 
In the case at bar, how the district court calculated the 
untimeliness of Lovasz's habeas petition is unclear. 
Apparently the magistrate judge was unaware that Lovasz's 
petition for allowance of appeal in his second PCRA 
proceedings was pending before the Pennsylvania Supreme 
Court until September 26, 1996. Lovasz did not bring this 
to the court's attention until he filed objections to the 
magistrate judge's report and recommendation. The district 
court adopted the report and recommendation without 
discussing whether Lovasz's second PCRA petition was 
properly filed for the purposes of S 2244(d)(2). 
 
We conclude that Lovasz's habeas petition was timely 
filed. When AEDPA took effect on April 24, 1996, Lovasz's 
second PCRA petition was pending before the Pennsylvania 
Supreme Court until September 26, 1996. Under 
S 2244(d)(2), this period of time "shall not be counted" as 
part of S 2244(d)(1)'s one-year period of limitation. Thus, 
Lovasz's one-year period did not expire until September 26, 
1997. Lovasz filed his habeas petition on July 31, 1997, 
well within S 2244(d)(1)'s time limitation, and the district 
court erred in dismissing it as untimely. 
 
III. 
 
Because we find that Lovasz's habeas petition was timely 
filed under S 2244(d)(1) and (2), we grant the certificate of 
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appealability and reverse and remand to the district court 
for further consideration. 
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